

October 16, 2006



# Logistics

## Use of DoD Resources Supporting Hurricane Katrina Disaster (D-2007-002)

Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General

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### **Acronyms**

DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
JTF	Joint Task Force
NRP	National Response Plan
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command



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October 16, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Report on the Use of DoD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina  
Disaster (Report No. D-2007-002)

We are providing this report for review and comment. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict did not respond to the draft report; however, we considered comments from the U.S. Northern Command when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. We request additional comments on Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2. Therefore, we request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity provide comments on Recommendations 1. and Recommendations 2. by November 1, 2006.

If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [Audros@dodig.osd.mil](mailto:Audros@dodig.osd.mil). Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Donald A. Bloomer at (703) 604-8863 (DSN 664-8863) or Mr. Keith M. Owens at (703) 604-8865 (DSN 664-8865). If management requests, we will provide a formal briefing on the results. For the report distribution, see Appendix L. The team members are listed inside the back cover

By direction of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing:

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Wanda A. Scott", is positioned above the typed name.

Wanda A. Scott  
Assistant Inspector General  
Readiness and Operations Support



## Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2007-002

October 16, 2006

(Project No. D2006-D000LA-0009.000)

### Use of DoD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster

#### Executive Summary

**Who Should Read This Report and Why?** DoD personnel responsible for providing support to civil authorities supporting the National Response Plan should read this report because it provides information on DoD and civilian response in support of emergency or disaster relief efforts.

**Background.** We performed the audit in response to a September 2005 request by the Principal Deputy Inspector General, DoD to assess the use of DoD resources in providing relief efforts in support of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and the impact on readiness resulting from the DoD resources affected by Hurricane Katrina and those supporting the relief efforts.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major disasters and other emergencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, who represents the Secretary of Homeland Security, manages the Federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) is the executive agent for Homeland Security with overall supervision for DoD homeland defense activities. The U.S. Northern Command is the DoD-supported combatant command<sup>†</sup> for civil support within the United States. Active and Reserve Component military personnel are the supporting forces to the National Response Plan and provided Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts after the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the primary Federal agencies, and State and local first responders were exceeded.

DoD has military resources that may be used in responding to a domestic crisis. However, there are limitations and restrictions on providing military support to civil authorities within the United States and its Territories. DoD Directive 3025.1 states that DoD Components cannot procure or maintain supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for providing military support to civil authorities and emergencies unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

**Results.** The Governors of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi requested relief assistance from the President, who declared and issued Presidential Disaster Declarations by August 29, 2005. The Presidential Disaster Declarations authorize Federal agencies to support State disaster relief efforts. The response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster along the U.S. Gulf Coast area on August 29, 2005, was the first opportunity for the

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<sup>†</sup> A supported combatant command has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority assigns. A combatant command is a unified or specified command under a single commander established by the President.

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency to execute the National Response Plan supported by DoD Federal forces. Although DoD provided overwhelming support when requested, lessons learned identified where the U.S. Northern Command can improve its immediate response and support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and civil authorities during future natural or manmade disasters.

Specifically, the U.S. Northern Command should improve its planning, coordinating, training, and exercising with DoD Components and the primary Federal agencies responsible for supporting the National Response Plan. Areas where the U.S. Northern Command can improve its support to civil authorities include:

- planning and coordinating military support to civil authorities,
- developing a plan for the joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration of military forces,
- standardizing interoperable communication architectures,
- coordinating DoD logistics commodity support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
- training and exercising DoD Components and Federal agencies in support of the National Response Plan.

Improvements in those areas, if implemented, will enable DoD to continue to provide timely assistance to civil authorities during future disaster relief efforts.

**Management Comments.** We issued the draft report on August 7, 2006. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict did not comment on the draft report. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity should submit management comments for final report by November 1, 2006.

The U.S. Northern Command Inspector General concurred with the findings and recommendations. The U.S. Northern Command is collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency and other primary Federal agencies to improve training and exercises to prepare military forces to respond during future domestic natural disasters. Specifically, DoD is collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security to develop a National Level Exercise program based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios to improve the future training of military resources during domestic natural crisis. See the Findings section of the report for a discussion of the management comments and the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of comments.

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## Background

**Hurricane Katrina Disaster.** Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history. Its strong winds created a storm surge that reached a height of 27 feet along the Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama to New Orleans, Louisiana that affected more than 90,000 square miles and displaced more than 1.5 million people. The storm surge caused flooding that toppled and breached the New Orleans levee system and floodwalls, leaving 80 percent of the city under water and flooding more than 180,000 homes. Hurricane Katrina caused widespread damage and destruction to critical communication nodes, power plants, gas and oil utilities and services, water treatment plants, hospitals, government facilities, and transportation infrastructure in Mississippi, Louisiana, and parts of coastal Alabama. Major highways and bridges in and around Mississippi and Louisiana were impassable.

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina caused widespread damage and destruction to critical infrastructure in Mississippi, Louisiana, and parts of coastal Alabama on August 29, 2005. This extensive damage throughout the Gulf Coast area affected first responders at State and local levels. State and local capabilities to provide disaster relief were quickly exceeded, resulting in the need for an immediate Federal response and support from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and DoD military support from U.S. Northern Command<sup>1</sup> (USNORTHCOM) to civil authorities. On August 30, 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security declared Hurricane Katrina an Incident of National Significance.<sup>2</sup>

**Federal Civil Support Guidance.** Guidance in the Robert T. Stafford Act, dated October 30, 2000, governs how DoD will respond to a natural or manmade disaster, or emergency within the United States and its Territories. The guidance states that the Federal government is to provide orderly assistance to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters. The Robert T. Stafford Act also authorizes the President to provide DoD resources for relief efforts. See Appendix C for additional guidance governing DoD civil support.

**Department of Homeland Security.** Established on November 25, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Within the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA is the agency responsible for coordinating the Federal response to a natural disaster or emergency within the United States and

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Northern Command is the combatant command whose area of responsibility is the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and portions of the Caribbean region.

<sup>2</sup> An Incident of National Significance is an actual or potential high impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of local, State, Tribal, Federal, nongovernmental, private entities to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.

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its Territories. Its mission is to prepare the nation for all hazards and to manage the Federal response and recovery efforts after any national incident.

The Department of Homeland Security issued the National Response Plan (NRP) in December 2004, outlining Federal responsibilities for coordinating civil and military responses to natural and manmade disasters. The NRP enables all levels of Government to work together efficiently and effectively to manage domestic incidents. The NRP lists 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and assigns a primary Federal agency to support those functions based on authorities, resources, and capabilities. See Appendix D for a complete list of the “National Response Plan Emergency Support Functions” and the primary agency for each function. Primary Federal agencies prepare plans and procedures to support the ESFs. The NRP identifies DoD as a supporting agency for all 15 ESFs. In addition, the NRP states that DoD has significant resources that may be available to support the Federal response to an emergency or disaster. FEMA initiated requests for Federal military support to civil authorities before and after the President of the United States issued a disaster declaration for Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was the first opportunity for FEMA to use the NRP with the support of DoD Federal forces.

During Hurricane Katrina, FEMA requested Federal military support to civil authorities. FEMA uses the mission assignment process for requesting DoD resources. The process involves FEMA submitting a valid request for assistance for approval by the Secretary of Defense. The following conditions must occur before there is a FEMA mission assignment number based upon a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

- First, the disaster has to exceed State and local responders’ capabilities.
- Second, the affected State Governor must request assistance from the President.
- Third, the President must sign a Presidential Disaster Declaration starting the FEMA mission assignment process.

Appendix E shows “Presidential Disaster Declarations” for the affected States with FEMA mission assignment numbers.

**Military Support to Civil Authorities.** Military support to civil authorities is the most widely recognized form of DoD civil support because it occurs in high profile emergencies, such as natural or manmade disasters, like Hurricane Katrina. The President and the Secretary of Defense assign missions and tasks to USNORTHCOM only after State and local capabilities are exhausted or when a unique military capability is required. On October 1, 2002, the Combatant Commander, USNORTHCOM, operating under Title 10<sup>3</sup> assumed responsibilities for land, aerospace, and sea defense of North America for supporting civil authorities in their response to attacks and natural disasters,

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<sup>3</sup> Title 10 is a Federal military force under the command and control of the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense.

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including military support to civil authorities, military support for civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance during civil disturbances. The 1st and 5th U.S. Armies assist USNORTHCOM with providing military support to civil authorities. Before Hurricane Katrina, USNORTHCOM was establishing Army North as an Army Service Component Command. In October 2005, Army North attained initial operational capability. The 5<sup>th</sup> U.S. Army became U.S. Army North during the Hurricane Katrina relief operations. Both 1st and 5th U.S. Armies coordinate Federal military assistance for relief operations in their respective regions. They provide senior military personnel to fill Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) positions and support staff during an emergency or disaster. The DCO is responsible for receiving, validating, and forwarding requests for assistance to appropriate military organizations through USNORTHCOM to the Secretary of Defense. DoD Title 10 forces operated in the joint operations area,<sup>4</sup> consisting of the affected states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, with the National Guard forces.

**The National Guard.** Section 502 (f), title 32, United States Code allows National Guard units to perform Federal or State missions. National Guard units under State Active Duty status perform State missions. National Guard forces under either State Active Duty or under Title 32 status are not affected by regulations that apply to Title 10 forces. The Governor controls National Guard Forces under State Active Duty and Title 32 status. The Governor does not retain control of National Guard forces when they are activated in Title 10 status. National Guard Forces under State Active Duty status is the military's first responder to a natural disaster occurring in their respective State or Territory. Appendix F explains Title 10 and National Guard Relationships.

National Guard forces deployed under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to provide support during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. EMAC is an agreement among participating States, the District of Columbia, and U.S. Territories to provide assistance across State lines during a natural or manmade emergency if the crisis response requirements exceed a State's capabilities. More than 50,000 National Guard troops from the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. Territories were deployed under the command and control of the affected State Governors. The Hurricane Katrina disaster relief operations were the most extensive use of EMAC in its 9 years of existence.

**Joint Task Force Katrina.** DoD military resources under Title 10 authority provided critical personnel and equipment support during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. On August 30, 2005, after the President issued Disaster Declarations, USNORTHCOM established and activated Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina). The mission of JTF-Katrina was to save lives, minimize human suffering, and restore critical services while exercising close coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies. The Commander, JTF-Katrina had command

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<sup>4</sup> A joint operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

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and control of more than 20,000 Title 10 forces that were deployed to provide disaster relief.

## **Objectives**

The overall objective was to audit the use of DoD resources in providing relief efforts in support of Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, we evaluated the use of Title 10 and Title 32 military forces and DoD civilian personnel supporting the relief efforts to determine their effectiveness and the impact on readiness and logistics support provided by DoD.

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## DoD Civil Support to Hurricane Katrina

Upon request from the President and the affected States' Governors, DoD responded overwhelmingly to the relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. More than 70,000 military and civilian personnel provided critical resources to civil authorities responding to the disaster when State and local resources were exhausted. The DoD response to Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned highlighted where DoD can improve its future to the National Response Plan (NRP). Specifically, USNORTHCOM can improve ongoing planning, coordinating, training, and exercising of the NRP with DoD Components and primary Federal agencies supporting the plan to better respond and support future natural or manmade disasters.

### DoD Support to Hurricane Katrina Relief

**Preparation for Hurricane Katrina.** The pre-planning and coordination between DoD and FEMA for Hurricane Katrina began days prior to Katrina's landfall. On August 23, 2005, DoD began tracking a tropical depression that later became Hurricane Katrina. From August 24, 2005, through August 26, 2005, DoD through USNORTHCOM, issued orders alerting DoD Components and agencies to prepare to provide assistance upon request. During this timeframe, DoD, responded to 15 surge and emergency mission assignments that FEMA issued for deploying DCOs and supporting staffs and requests to use military installations as FEMA operational staging bases. The 1st U.S. Army deployed a DCO in an exercise status to Florida, where Hurricane Katrina made its first landfall. Later, DCOs and supporting staffs deployed to Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina making its second landfall. The 5th U.S. Army provided a DCO and support staff for Louisiana before Hurricane Katrina made its second landfall on August 29, 2005. The U.S. Joint Forces Command provided both 1st and 5th U.S. Army DCOs to work with FEMA Federal Coordinating Officers. Appendix G contains the "Timeline of DoD Significant Events."

**DoD Title 10 Missions and Accomplishments.** On August 30, 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USNORTHCOM to make available all necessary DoD resources to FEMA for relief efforts. To support this mission, USNORTHCOM established and activated JTF-Katrina to provide military forces. From August 30, 2005, to October 13, 2005, JTF-Katrina forces saved lives, minimized human suffering, and restored critical services in coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies.

On September 4, 2005, JTF-Katrina personnel established a designated joint operations area in the affected areas. FEMA initiated 111 mission assignments requesting the use of DoD Title 10 resources. Appendix H contains the "FEMA Mission Assignments for DoD Resources."



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The numerous accomplishments of Title 10 forces during the immediate disaster relief period include:

- conducting air and ground rescue,
- searching house-to-house for survivors,
- providing communications support,
- providing emergency medical care, and
- evacuating patients and displaced victims.

In addition to performing relief missions, DoD deployed more than 22,000 military and civilian personnel to JTF-Katrina and provided mission-essential equipment to the joint operations area. The mission-essential equipment consisted of:

- rotary and fixed wing aircraft,
- naval ships with sealift logistics and hospital support capabilities,
- satellite communication systems and towers,
- high-water vehicles and boats, and
- field hospitals and medical equipment.

By September 12, 2005, Title 10 forces under the command and control of JTF-Katrina peaked at more than 22,000 from all Military Services and civilian personnel. The Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Materiel Command provided critical logistics, commodities, and equipment support. After September 13, 2005, JTF-Katrina forces began redeploying to their home station, but were delayed by Hurricane Ophelia, which never made landfall. DoD forces were also delayed because they supported the recovery and relief efforts after Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, 2005, in Texas and southwestern Louisiana.

On October 13, 2005, JTF-Katrina departed the joint operations area leaving a small contingent of Title 10 forces, which included 209 personnel from the 21<sup>st</sup> Combat Support Hospital, under the command and control of the Louisiana DCO. On November 16, 2005, when the Louisiana DCO departed the disaster area, FEMA continued the recovery efforts. Appendix I contains a complete list of Title 10 accomplishments and equipment supporting hurricane relief efforts.

**National Guard Missions and Accomplishments.** The National Guard and its personnel and equipment played a significant role in the relief and recovery efforts. The Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi requested assistance from other EMAC member states after declaring a state of emergency. Several Army and Air National Guard units responded to requests under EMAC. As of September 8, 2005, all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and three

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U.S. Territories were providing disaster relief support in the joint operations area, with personnel strength peaking at more than 50,000 troops. During this deployment, National Guardsmen saved lives, minimized human suffering, assisted law enforcement, and mitigated property damage, while coordinating with Federal, State and local agencies in the joint operations area. The National Guard also provided mission-essential equipment to the joint operations area. Appendix I contains the National Guard's numerous accomplishments and the critical major end items and equipment it used to provide disaster relief. Appendix J contains the status of National Guard Forces strength in the Joint Operations Area.

**Other DoD Support.** The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the only DoD Component with an assigned function in the NRP. The Corps of Engineers has first responder authority under Title 33, Public Law 84-99, Flood Control, and as a primary Federal agency for ESF-3, Public Works and Engineering. As of September 30, 2005, more than 2,800 Corps of Engineers personnel were in the joint operations area. As of April 2006, the Corps of Engineers remained in the disaster area performing debris removal and repairs to the New Orleans' levee system.

## **DoD Civil Support Lessons Learned**

The overall deployment of DoD assets in support of Hurricane Katrina disaster relief was the largest use of DoD military and civilian personnel performing a civil support mission in the continental United States. DoD Title 10 personnel provided the support to the primary Federal agencies that FEMA requested through the mission assignment process. Our review of DoD mission assignments, including DoD support to FEMA and civil authorities, showed that DoD effectively supported all 15 ESFs in the NRP during the disaster relief efforts.

Although DoD forces were recognized for their immediate and overwhelming response, lessons learned identified that USNORTHCOM could improve its future response and support to domestic crises. Specifically, the planning, coordinating, training, and exercising among USNORTHCOM, DoD Components, and primary Federal agencies supporting the NRP need to be improved. These lessons learned are discussed in the following sections: DoD Military Support to Civil Authorities; Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration of military forces; Interoperable Communication Architecture; DoD Logistics Commodity Support to FEMA; and Civil Support Training and Exercises.

**DoD Military Support to Civil Authorities.** DoD support to civil authorities requires primary and supporting agencies to plan and coordinate their plans before and during their response to any emergency or natural disaster. Guidance that governs DoD support to civil authorities should reflect changes in the designation of executive agency and organizational structure. For example, DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," January 15, 1993, does not recognize the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the executive agent for defense support to civil authorities or USNORTHCOM as

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the supporting combatant command for defense support to civil authorities. Similarly, DoD Directive 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” February 17, 1997, should also reflect those changes.

The primary Federal agencies drafted 21 of 23 plans supporting the NRP when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. USNORTHCOM provided the requested assistance to the primary Federal agencies even though supporting plans and procedures were not completed. Additionally, the USNORTHCOM “Civil Support Concept of Employment,” dated May 13, 2005, was still in draft at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall. This document summarizes tasks, planning considerations, and operating processes for civil support from the strategic to the tactical level, and describes the activities of USNORTHCOM to execute its civil support responsibilities at the operational level.

Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina identified that USNORTHCOM did not coordinate with FEMA on using military assets according to their capabilities; did not coordinate deploying and integrating Title 10 forces with National Guard forces’ capabilities; and did not explain the appropriate use of Title 10, Title 32, and State Active Duty forces. Planning and coordination among USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and primary Federal agencies must occur in responding to and supporting future relief efforts for natural or manmade disasters.

**Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).**

USNORTHCOM did not implement a plan to establish a JRSOI area to receive DoD Title 10 forces during the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. The JRSOI is critical in moving military forces into a joint operations area. The JRSOI consists of the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materials into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina revealed limited reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for both DoD Title 10 and National Guard forces that deployed in the joint operations area. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina made a second landfall, Title 10 and National Guard forces deployed into the joint operations area so rapidly that commanders experienced difficulty in managing forces. The rapid flow of Title 10 and National Guard forces into the joint operations area led to problems with coordinating the missions performed between Title 10 and National Guard forces. These coordination problems added to the existing problems with unity of effort and situational awareness in the joint operations area. Another factor contributing to the coordination problems was that the NRP did not provide detailed guidance on how DoD military forces should be integrated into the Federal response during a natural disaster. Planning and coordinating Title 10 and National Guard forces that are responding jointly to future natural or manmade disasters should occur among USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and FEMA. Appendixes J and K show the strength of National Guard and Title 10 forces deployed in the JTF-Katrina joint operations area.

**Interoperable Communication Architecture.** Interoperable communications provides responders with a common operating picture and the ability to respond as a cohesive unit. During Hurricane Katrina, communication networks were among the infrastructures demolished in the Gulf Coast area. Inadequate

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communication affected Title 10 and National Guard forces' relief operations for several days. A lack of communications interoperability between Federal and State forces significantly degraded the situational awareness and affected the integration of Title 10 and National Guard forces within the joint operations area. Federal and State communication problems required communication support from DoD Title 10 forces. Lessons learned identified the need for planning and standardizing interoperable communication capabilities with USNORTHCOM for supporting Federal, State, and local first responders during future natural or manmade disasters.

**DoD Logistics Commodity Support to FEMA.** The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the largest DoD combat support agency that stores and distributes DoD war reserve materiel. DLA provided critical commodity support to FEMA during the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. FEMA relied heavily on logistical commodities, which included Meals Ready-to-Eat, commercial nonperishable meals, bulk fuel, vehicles, repair parts and medical supplies. However, the DLA mission did not include providing supplies for domestic crises and it did not receive funds to support this mission. Lessons learned identified where USNORTHCOM logistics personnel can assist FEMA with improving procedures for procuring, tracking, and managing critical commodities for future natural or manmade disasters.

**Civil Support Training and Exercises.** The existing training and exercises of DoD, Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, primary Federal agencies, and State and local agencies did not adequately prepare them for a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. The Homeland Security Top Officials' exercises did not adequately challenge responding agencies, including DoD, to plan for worst-case scenarios. The exercises also did not use DoD active military and Reserve Components effectively in their support to civil authorities. For example, USNORTHCOM sent two logistics personnel to participate in the Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004, but their participation was limited to simulated logistical support. Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina identified a need for USNORTHCOM to plan training and exercises with FEMA and primary Federal agencies on integrating military forces during a domestic natural disaster. The DoD response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted a need for exercising the NRP and its approved supporting plans.

## **Hurricane Katrina's Effect on DoD Readiness**

The Hurricane Katrina disaster affected DoD installations and facilities. Damages to military installations ranged from minor roofing repairs to severe flooding. Hurricane Katrina damaged eight Navy installations, three U.S. Army Reserve Centers, the Louisiana National Guard Headquarters at Jackson Barracks, Louisiana and Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. The hurricane damage affected the day-to-day operations of DoD units and agencies at these installations. Hurricane Katrina affected Army Reserve battle assemblies<sup>5</sup> and

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<sup>5</sup> Battle Assembly is the U.S. Army Reserve term for weekend drills conducted by Army reservists at their home station. It replaced the term drills, unit training attendance, or weekend drills.

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military recruiting centers and also delayed the deployment of some units to support ongoing DoD operations. For example, the 1108th Aviation Class Repair Activity Depot based in Mississippi was scheduled to deploy to the Middle East; however Hurricane Katrina affected some of the personnel assigned to the unit. As a result, those members were not able to deploy. The unaffected members from the 1108th and volunteers from the 1107th Aviation Class Repair Activity Depot were activated to fulfill the mission.

Hurricane Katrina damaged family homes that affected more than 230,000 DoD personnel and their dependents along the Gulf Coast. Safe havens were made available to displaced DoD military and civilian families as a result of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Task Force Care<sup>6</sup> assisted deployed military members and displaced military families. Overall, DoD Components and agencies affected by Hurricane Katrina and units that supported disaster relief efforts in the joint operations area reported a minimal effect on readiness to their mission or support to DoD contingency operations. Based on our review of lessons learned and after-action reports, we concur with the DoD assessment that there was minimal impact on mission and operational readiness.

## Conclusion

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed DoD military and civilian personnel to support the disaster relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005. The DoD response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest deployment of military forces in response to a natural disaster in the United States. Although Hurricane Katrina did affect DoD resources within the disaster area, we agree with the DoD assessment of a minimal impact on readiness to support ongoing missions while providing disaster relief assistance. As a supporting agency to the NRP, DoD accomplished numerous FEMA mission assignments during its disaster relief efforts. Those accomplishments supported the 15 ESFs in the NRP despite legal limitations and restrictions placed on DoD military forces. However, DoD support of the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts highlighted areas that USNORTHCOM could improve in its defense support to civil authorities. The integration of Title 10 Federal forces with National Guard forces during disaster relief operations identified areas for improvement. DoD needs to improve planning and coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security, Federal agencies, the National Guard Bureau, and the National Guard. Improvements in those areas will enable DoD to continue to provide timely assistance to civil authorities if needed during future disaster relief efforts.

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<sup>6</sup> Task Force Care was established to provide relief assistance to military personnel and family members affected by the Hurricane Katrina disaster.

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## Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred with the recommendation, and offered several suggestions to improve the clarity of the report. The Inspector General proposed many factual and editorial changes.

The Inspector General stated that the report needs to increase the distinction between the U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau. The Inspector General indicated that the National Guard Bureau is a bureau within DoD, and not an agency overarching all the States' National Guard forces. The Inspector General also indicated that the report should distinguish the difference between Title 32 status forces and State Active Duty forces. A national guardsman can be in only one of the two State statuses at any given time. When the National Guard was under Title 32 or State Active Duty status, they were under the command and control of the State's Governor.

The Inspector General indicated that several appendixes should be changed. We revised Appendix C, Appendix F, and Appendix J to use the term National Guard to include State Active Duty and Title 32 status forces.

**Audit Response.** The comments from the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command were partially responsive. We request that the Inspection General, U.S. Northern Command, provide additional information on actions proposed to address the recommendation. We considered all factual and editorial suggestions and revised the final report to include the necessary suggestions that could be supported by audit evidence. Based on management comments, we decided to replace "State Active Duty" and "Title 32" with "National Guard" whenever appropriate to reduce factual misstatements.

**U.S. Air Force Comments.** Although not required to respond, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements agreed with the finding.

**U.S. Transportation Command Comments.** Although not required to respond, the Director of Program Analysis and Financial Management agreed with the draft report as written.

**National Guard Bureau Comments.** Although not required to respond, the Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau, agreed with the majority of the report. However, he indicated there is a difference between National Guard forces under Title 32 and State Active Duty status. The Chief of Internal Review also stated that the National Guard supported the relief efforts by assisting law enforcement and, although inadequate communications affected the relief efforts, they did not delay the National Guard's response.

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## Recommendations, Management Comments and Audit Response

**Revised Recommendations.** As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation 3.e. to include Department of Homeland Security conferences and exercises. We revised Recommendation 3.f. to include coordination with the Department of Homeland Security as an agency.

**1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy update DoD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” to identify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the executive agent for defense support of civil authorities and the U.S. Northern Command as the supporting combatant command for defense support of civil authorities.**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not comment on Recommendation 1. Therefore, we request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provide comments on the final report.

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** Although not required to respond, the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command agreed. The Inspector General indicated the recommendation should be redirected to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

**Audit Response.** We did not revise our recommendation because the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the proponent of DoD Directive 3025.1 and thus has the authority and responsibility to update the directive.

**2. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict update DoD Directive 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities” to identify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the executive agent for defense support of civil authorities and the U.S. Northern Command as the supporting combatant command for defense support of civil authorities.**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict did not comment on Recommendation 2. Therefore, we request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict provide comments on the final report.

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** Although not required to respond, the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command agreed. The Inspector General indicated the recommendation should be redirected to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

**Audit Response.** We did not revise our recommendation because the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Combat is the proponent of DoD Directive 3025.15 and thus has the authority and responsibility to update the directive.

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**3. We recommend that the Combatant Commander, U.S. Northern Command:**

**a. Complete and implement plans on military support to civil authorities for all DoD Components and agencies supporting the National Response Plan.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred.

**Audit Response.** We request the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command provide the estimated date for implementation of actions proposed to address the recommendation in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

**b. Coordinate with the National Guard Bureau for developing a plan for joint integration of DoD military resources responding to and supporting the National Response Plan.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred.

**Audit Response.** We request the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command provide the estimated date for implementation of actions proposed to address the recommendation in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

**c. Coordinate military communication capabilities with primary Federal agencies and State and local authorities to improve standardization and interoperability of communications.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred.

**Audit Response.** We request a date of U.S. Northern Command actions implementing recommendations in the final report in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although



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not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

**d. Coordinate and support improving the Federal Emergency Management Agency's logistical management process and in-transit visibility for requested equipment and supplies during a domestic crisis.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred and requested auditors to include Department of Homeland Security.

**Audit Response.** The comments from the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command are responsive. We revised the recommendation to include the Department of Homeland Security, which satisfies the intent of the recommendation.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

**e. Plan and coordinate DoD participation in the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency's domestic crisis exercises and conferences.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred and requested auditors to include Department of Homeland Security.

**Audit Response.** The comments from the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command are responsive. We revised the recommendation to include the Department of Homeland Security, which satisfies the intent of the recommendation.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

**f. Develop training and exercise programs that support the National Response Plan in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.**

**U.S. Northern Command Comments.** The Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command concurred, and requested auditors to include the Department of Homeland Security in the recommendation.

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**Audit Response.** The comments from the Inspector General, U.S. Northern Command are responsive. We revised the recommendation to include the Department of Homeland Security, which satisfies the intent of the recommendation.

**Unsolicited Comments.** The Deputy Chief of Staff of Air, Space & Information Operations, Plans & Requirements concurred without comment. The Chief of Internal Review, National Guard Bureau concurred without comment. Although not requested to comment, both the United States Air Force and the National Guard Bureau agreed with a draft of this report.

## **Management Comments Required**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provide comments on the final report.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict did not comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict provide comments on the final report.

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## Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the use of DoD resources in supporting the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts. Also, we evaluated whether the readiness of DoD Components located in the affected area and those supporting the Katrina disaster relief efforts was affected. We researched applicable laws and regulations including Title 10, United States Code; Title 32, United States Code; the Posse Comitatus Act; the Stafford Act; and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. We also reviewed documents containing policy and guidance on the National Response Plan and DoD Directives 3025.1 and 3025.15.

We sent questionnaires to various military units who supported the disaster relief efforts to gather as much information as possible to determine what support was rendered and potential lessons to be learned. We met with officials at the Government Accountability Office, the Air Force Audit Agency, the Army Audit Agency, and the Naval Audit Service to minimize duplicating information that might be reported as a result of several other audits with similar interest. We also met with USNORTHCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the National Guard Bureau to discuss their roles in supporting Hurricane Katrina disaster relief.

We performed this audit from October 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We did not review any management control program because the review of the management control program was not an announced objective.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

**Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area.** The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the DoD Approach to Business Transformation high-risk area.

### Prior Coverage

No prior coverage has been conducted on the use of DoD resources supporting hurricanes during the last 5 years.

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## Appendix B. Glossary

**Defense Coordinating Officer.** A military or civilian official who has been designated by the Department of Defense to exercise some delegated authority of the Department of Defense executive agent to coordinate military support to civil authorities activities.

**Emergency Support Function.** Government and certain private sector capabilities that are grouped into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents.

**Execute Orders.** Orders issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities' decision to initiate military operations.

**Federal Coordinating Officer.** An official appointed by the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate Federal assistance to a State affected by a disaster or emergency. The Federal Coordinating Officer is the DoD liaison with the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the disaster.

**First Responders.** These are local and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency personnel who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for protecting and preserving life, property, evidence, and the environment.

**Incident.** An occurrence that requires emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property or natural resources.

**Natural Disaster.** Any natural event or incident (hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, wildlife fires or other natural occurrence causing significant damage) producing severe and widespread damage of such magnitude as to require significant resources from outside the affected area to provide the necessary response. A wide range of natural disasters can quickly produce an overwhelming demand on the abilities of local, State, and Tribal government to cope with the scale and magnitude of the disaster.

**Presidential Declared Disaster.** Any natural catastrophe (hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which the President determines caused damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Act to supplement the available resources of State, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering.

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**Support Agency.** A Federal Department or agency designated to assist a specific primary agency with available resources, capabilities, or expertise in support of Emergency Support Functions response operations.

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## Appendix C. DoD Civil Support Guidance

**Robert T. Stafford Relief Act, October 30, 2000 (sections 5121-5204c, title 42, United States Code).** The Stafford Act (the Act) enables the Federal Government to provide orderly assistance to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters. The Act establishes a program for disaster preparedness and response, which the President delegated to the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA. The Act includes the procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, and the type and scope of Federal assistance available. The Act also authorizes the President to provide DoD assets for relief. The President may direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to use its authorities and resources to support a State and local response.

**DoD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” January 1993, and DoD Directive 3025.15, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” February 1997.** These two directives govern all DoD civil support within the 50 States, District of Columbia, and U.S. Territories. The directives establish the local commander’s authority to provide immediate assistance when serious conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters. DoD Directive 3025.1 states that DoD Components cannot procure or maintain supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for providing military support to civil authorities and emergencies unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. This directive also appoints the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent to assist the Secretary of Defense in executing his responsibility to provide military support to civil authorities. DoD Directive 3025.15 outlines the approval process for requests for assistance. The Director of Military Support, the Secretary of the Army (as the Executive Agent), and, in some cases, the Secretary of Defense must evaluate each request against the following criteria: appropriateness, cost, legality, lethality, readiness, and risk.

**Posse Comitatus Act, 1994 (section 1385, title 18, United States Code).** The Posse Comitatus Act, along with supporting legislation and regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps from performing law enforcement functions (arresting, pursuing, searching, or seizing) against U.S. civilians. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to military operations, such as flying defensive missions over U.S. cities, protecting military installations, or enforcing law and regulations on military installations. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the National Guard when it is operating at the direction of the State Governor in a Title 32 or State active duty status; it only applies in a Federal (Title 10) status.

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## Appendix D. National Response Plan Emergency Support Functions

ESF	Emergency Support Function	Primary Agency
1	Transportation	Department of Transportation
2	Communications	Department of Homeland Security
3	Public Works and Engineering	DoD & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
4	Firefighting	Department of Agriculture
5	Emergency Management	Department of Homeland Security
6	Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	Department of Homeland Security
7	Resource Support	General Services Administration
8	Public Health and Medical Services	Department of Health and Human Services
9	Urban Search and Rescue	Department of Homeland Security
10	Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	Department of Homeland Security-U.S. Coast Guard
11	Agriculture and Natural Resources	Department of Agriculture
12	Energy	Department of Energy
13	Public Safety and Security	Department of Homeland Security
14	Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation	Department of Homeland Security
15	External Affairs	Department of Homeland Security

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## Appendix E. Presidential Disaster Declarations

State	Declaration Number <sup>1</sup>	Date of Approval
Florida	DR-1602-FL	8/28/2005
Louisiana	DR-1603-LA	8/29/2005
Mississippi	DR-1604-MS	8/29/2005
Alabama	DR-1605-AL	8/29/2005

### Request for Assistance at the Disaster Field Site

1. State or local agencies unable to provide a capability to respond to an incident.
2. Request for assistance is forwarded to State Coordinating Officer in the form of a FEMA Assistance Request Form and presented to the Federal Coordinating Officer.
3. The State Coordinating Officer develops an Action Request Form and presents it to the primary Federal agencies to review and analyze.
4. If the primary Federal agency cannot provide support, a request form is sent to Defense Coordinating Officer. If DoD is able to support the request, the Defense Coordinating Officer validates the request and returns it to the Federal Coordinating Officer.
5. If the Federal Coordinating Officer validates the request, then the Action Request Form becomes a validated mission assignment.
6. The Defense Coordinating Officer, the Joint Forces Commander, or the Joint Task Force can review a validated mission assignment.
7. The mission assignment form is routed from the Defense Coordinating Officer to the Joint Director of Military Support via USNORTHCOM, who reviews it and initiates mission analysis. The mission assignment is forwarded to Joint Director of Military Support, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), and the Secretary of Defense for approval.
8. Upon Secretary of Defense's approval, the Joint Director of Military Support issues an execute order to USNORTHCOM, supporting combatant commands, Military Components, and agencies, as applicable.

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<sup>1</sup> FEMA mission assignment number with the assigned Presidential Disaster Declaration.



## Appendix F. Relationships Between Title 10 Forces and the National Guard

### Federal ----- State

Issue	Active Duty Title 10	National Guard Title 32	State Active Duty
<b>Authority to order to duty</b>	President, in accordance with Title 10, with the consent of the Governor, unless called to active duty under an involuntary call-up authority (partial mobilization, or total mobilization)	Title 32 United States Code §502 (f) allows units to accomplish training for Federal missions, or other missions approved by DoD	Governor, as determined by state statute
<b>Command and Control</b>	Federal chain to the President as Commander-in-Chief	State chain – National Guard commander retains command over those National Guard members when participating in exercises with Federal troops, but has no jurisdiction over the Federal troops or the Federal installation, regardless of rank	State chain
<b>Uniform Code of Military Justice</b>	Uniform Code of Military Justice in Title 10	State Code of Military Justice or equivalent applies, plus limited courts martial authority under Title 32	State Code of Military Justice or equivalent applies, plus limited courts martial authority under Title 32
<b>Posse Comitatus</b>	Applies	Does not apply	Does not apply
<b>Duty Funding</b>	Department of Defense	Department of Defense	State funded – could be reimbursed if performing mission for Federal entity or function

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## Appendix G. Timeline of DoD Significant Events

<b>August 19, 2005</b>	Secretary of Defense approved Severe Weather Execution Order for hurricane season.
<b>August 23, 2005</b>	First U.S. Army and USNORTHCOM began tracking a tropical depression that later became Hurricane Katrina.
<b>August 26, 2005</b>	Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) deployed to Florida.
<b>August 28, 2005</b>	DCOs deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana. President issued a Disaster Declaration for Florida. Hurricane Katrina Joint Staff Response Cell operating 24/7. The President directed the Secretary of Defense to “lean forward” regarding Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.
<b>August 30, 2005</b>	USNORTHCOM established and activated JTF-Katrina.
<b>September 4, 2005</b>	President ordered 7,200 troops to the joint operations area.
<b>September 8, 2005</b>	National Guard forces peaked at 50,625 personnel in the joint operations area.
<b>September 13, 2005</b>	DoD Title 10 forces peaked at 22,670 personnel in the joint operations area. JTF-Katrina shifted from disaster relief to recovery operations. Over 67,000 active and reserve component troops in the joint operations area.
<b>September 23, 2005</b>	U.S. Corps of Engineers drained 95 percent of New Orleans.
<b>October 11, 2005</b>	Engineers drained flood waters caused by Hurricane Rita.
<b>October 13, 2005</b>	After 45 days in the joint operations area, JTF-Katrina redeployed. Louisiana Defense Coordinating Officer assumed control of Title 10 forces in Louisiana
<b>November 16, 2005</b>	After 80 days in the joint operations area, Louisiana Defense Coordinating Officer departed Louisiana.

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## Appendix H. Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Assignments for DoD Resources

	Status as of 21 Dec 05	FEMA Mission Assignments		
State	Dollar Value	With Funds	Cancelled/ Replaced	Total Tracked
Alabama	\$ 2,560,000	5	5	10
Florida	\$ 150,000	3	3	6
Louisiana	\$ 809,982,200	26	23	49
Mississippi	\$ 1,324,370,800	24	19	43
Texas	\$ 70,000	3	0	3
<b>Total</b>	\$ 2,137,133,000	61	50	111

### Types of Mission Assignments

There are three types of mission assignments, each corresponding to a phase of a disaster declaration. FEMA prepares the surge series mission assignment in anticipation of an emergency or natural disaster occurs to pre-position materials that it may need; an emergency series mission assignment is prepared when an emergency is declared; and a disaster relief mission assignment is prepared after the President declares a national disaster.

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## Appendix I. Accomplishments and Equipment of Title 10 Forces and the National Guard

<p><b><u>Title 10 Accomplishments</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Air and ground rescue operations</li> <li>•House to house search for survivors</li> <li>•Communications support</li> <li>•Emergency medical care</li> <li>•Patients and displaced victims evacuation</li> <li>•Airfield and airport operations</li> <li>•Re-supply of food, ice, water, and fuel</li> <li>•Dewatering and levee repair</li> <li>•Ports and waterways clearing</li> <li>•Human remain collection</li> <li>•Damage assessment reporting</li> <li>•Restoring infrastructure</li> <li>•Debris removal</li> <li>•Mosquito abatement spraying</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Title 10 Equipment</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Rotary and fixed wing aircrafts</li> <li>•Naval ships with logistical support</li> <li>•Combat support hospitals</li> <li>•Medical equipment and kits</li> <li>•Engineer support equipment</li> <li>•Satellite communication systems</li> <li>•Land mobile radios</li> <li>•High water vehicles and cargo trucks</li> <li>•Tank and pump units</li> <li>•Zodiac boats</li> <li>•Water purification units</li> <li>•Forklifts and K-loaders</li> <li>•Generators and tents</li> <li>•Laundry and bath units</li> <li>•Digital video and imagery systems</li> </ul>
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<p><b><u>National Guard Accomplishments</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Law enforcement support</li> <li>•Search and rescue operations</li> <li>•Medical and shelter support</li> <li>•Food and water distribution</li> <li>•Levee repair</li> <li>•House to house search for survivors</li> <li>•Superdome evacuation</li> <li>•Patients and displaced victims evacuation</li> <li>•Refineries security</li> <li>•Traffic control checkpoints</li> <li>•Communication support</li> <li>•Emergency medical care</li> <li>•Mosquito abatement spraying</li> <li>•Debris removal</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>National Guard Equipment</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Rotary and fixed wing aircrafts</li> <li>•Medical equipment and kits</li> <li>•Engineer support equipment</li> <li>•High water vehicles and cargo trucks</li> <li>•Zodiac boats</li> <li>•Water purification units</li> <li>•Satellite communications equipment</li> <li>•Tank and pump units</li> <li>•Forklifts and K-loaders</li> <li>•Laundry and bath units</li> <li>•Fire trucks</li> <li>•Tents and generators</li> </ul>
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## Appendix J. Strength of National Guard Forces in the Joint Operations Area

As of Date	Army National Guard	Air National Guard	National Guard External Joint Operations Area	Total National Guard Force
August 28, 2005	4,444	932	0	5,376
August 29, 2005	6,908	933	0	7,841
August 30, 2005	9,668	956	0	10,624
August 31, 2005	10,428	960	522	11,910
September 1, 2005	14,284	972	522	15,778
September 3, 2005	24,548	2,034	923	27,505
September 4, 2005	29,588	3,244	1,035	33,867
September 8, 2005	40,667	5,321	4,637	50,625
September 12, 2005	41,530	4,032	2,470	48,032
September 23, 2005	30,091	3,445	2,070	35,606
September 29, 2005	25,550	4,271	1,731	31,552
October 8, 2005	18,229	3,611	534	22,374

Source: National Guard Bureau

This table does not include National Guard transient air crews deploying to and from the joint operations area.

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## **Appendix K. Strength of Title 10 Forces in the Joint Operations Area**

<b>Date</b>	<b>JTF-Katrina (Main)</b>	<b>JTF-Katrina (Forward)</b>	<b>Total Title 10 Force</b>
September 1, 2005	104	163	267
September 3, 2005	148	694	842
September 4, 2005	191	9,775	9,966
September 9, 2005	228	19,224	19,452
September 12, 2005	246	22,424	22,670
September 24, 2005	287	14,373	14,660
September 29, 2005	288	10,996	11,283
October 8, 2005	49	1,134	1,183
November 7, 2005	0	221	221

October 13, 2005 – JTF-Katrina passed Title 10 authority to the Louisiana DCO.

November 15, 2005 – 209 personnel from the 21<sup>st</sup> Combat Support Hospital departed Louisiana.

November 16, 2005 – The Louisiana DCO and element departed the joint operations area.

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## **Appendix L. Report Distribution**

### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  
    Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis  
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer  
    Deputy Chief Financial Officer  
    Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)  
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
    Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
    Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy

### **Joint Staff**

Director, Joint Staff

### **Department of the Army**

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Auditor General, Department of the Army  
Director, Army National Guard  
Head Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command

### **Department of the Navy**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)  
Naval Inspector General  
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

### **Department of the Air Force**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force  
Director, Air National Guard

### **Combatant Commands**

Commander, U.S. Northern Command  
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command  
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command  
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

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## **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Logistics Agency  
Chief, National Guard Bureau

## **Non-Defense Federal Organization**

Office of Management and Budget

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

Senate Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs  
House Committee on Appropriations  
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
House Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform





# U.S. Northern Command Comments

Final Report  
Reference



**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND  
AND  
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND**



MEMORANDUM FOR DoD IG  
ATTN: Mr. Keith Owens

SEP 07 2006

FROM: NORAD-US NORTHCOM/IG

SUBJECT: Comments to DRAFT Report on the "Use of DoD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster" (Project No. D2006-D000LA-0009.000)

We have reviewed the draft subject document and concur with the recommendations. Our comments are attached, several which are critical and substantive, and must be incorporated to ensure the accuracy of the final document. Should you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact Mr. Kervin Mack at [Kervin.mack@northcom.mil](mailto:Kervin.mack@northcom.mil) or DSN 692-3257.

  
STEVEN E. ARMSTRONG, Colonel, USAF  
Inspector General

## REVIEW OF DOD IG REPORT: USE OF DOD RESOURCES SUPPORTING THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER

### General Comments:

#### **Distinction between DoD Title 10 and National Guard (Title 32 or State Active Duty)**

**Forces:** The report blurs the distinction between DoD Title 10 forces and National Guard (Title 32 or State Active Duty) forces. It portrays the National Guard forces as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina, which then implies that the JTF Commander (thus DoD) has command, control and visibility of these forces. The report underplays the fact that National Guard forces were coordinated through the State Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and remained under State control. This lack of distinction has led to Lesson Learned recommendations in the report that places responsibility on DoD and USNORTHCOM for coordination of Title 32 forces in support of FEMA and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) of Title 32 forces deployed in the joint operations area. While greater coordination is needed between Title 10 and National Guard forces under Title 32 or State Active Duty, it is inappropriate to place the responsibility for these forces on DoD and USNORTHCOM when they are under State control.

#### **Training and exercising DoD Components and Federal agencies in support of the National Response Plan:**

Another Lesson Learned recommendation from the report identifies a need for USNORTHCOM to plan training and exercises with FEMA and primary Federal agencies on integrating military forces during a domestic natural disaster. USNORTHCOM conducts extensive training and exercises to prepare DoD components for their role and responsibilities under the National Response Plan. Efforts to coordinate and incorporate DHS, FEMA, other interagency stakeholders, and NGB into USNORTHCOM exercises has proven problematic due to their competing priorities and their limited ability to participate. This has prompted DoD and USNORTHCOM to work with DHS to seek other means to replicate interagency interaction during an exercise (such as simulation cells that replicate the interagency Joint Field Office).

In addition, DoD participation in DHS or FEMA-sponsored exercises (such as TOPOFF) has proven problematic due to a variety of exercise design issues (such as the focus on first responders and/or top officials, States' hesitation to appear overwhelmed and request Federal/DoD assistance, and short exercise duration). These issues severely restrict the scope and duration of DHS/FEMA-sponsored exercises and make it difficult to achieve DoD exercise objectives.

To resolve these problems, DoD is working with DHS to establish a National Level Exercise (NLE) program based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios. The NLE program is intended to focus national priorities on a limited number of national exercises that facilitate robust interagency and intergovernmental play with a scope and duration that can encompass DHS, FEMA, DOD and other interagency objectives.

**Logistics/Transportation Comments:**

N-NC continues to be diligent in our efforts to provide guidance and support to FEMA's logistical Management processes. N-NC J4 has been proactive in facilitating discussion, process education and training, and information sharing between FEMA and agency partners. N-NC participates in weekly status and logistics concern teleconferences between FEMA, DLA, and agency partners, and participates in FEMA logistics groups.

As a result of the Domestic Disaster Response Logistics Working Group meeting held in Springfield, VA on 12-13 April, N-NC took the DoD lead in a partnership with FEMA to develop a Logistics CONOP for Disaster Response. N-NC hosted a 3 day working group to provide direction and guidance, and facilitate the creation of a logistics annex for the FEMA 2006 Hurricane CONOP. Following CONOP development, N-NC sponsored a two day logistics exercise and drill whose purpose was to walk through the processes that should be codified in a logistics annex. In attendance for the drill were O-6/GS-15 and GO/FO/SES level representatives from FEMA, DLA, TRANSCOM, Joint Staff J4, Red Cross, FORSCOM, USACE, OSD, DSCP, and NGB.

In addition to the Logistics exercise, N-NC also participated in FEMA Region VI and Region IV Hurricane Preparedness tabletop exercises that further exercised logistics and communications capabilities and processes. The regional Hurricane preparedness exercise was designed to address key issues and lessons learned from all related After Action Reports and conferences; exercise key issues to determine what needs to be in an improvement plan; and increase regional collaboration and communication. Exercise objectives were to discuss the region's states plans, policies, and procedures during the pre and post - landfall periods of a major hurricane event, or natural disaster.

N-NC DLA LNO oversees the logistics support that FEMA receives from DLA. FEMA, in concert with DLA, has stockpiled emergency meals, water, tarps, plastic sheeting, medical equipment and essential pharmaceuticals. FEMA and DLA signed an agreement in March 2006 wherein DLA will provide the logistics support to ensure procurement, delivery, and vendor managed inventories of these commodities.

FEMA has implemented a commodity management system, an initiative that will enable FEMA to better manage its inventory. Additionally, FEMA now contracts with truck companies who have tracking capabilities so shipments into the affected area can be tracked. FEMA has also purchased the IRRIS tracking program to track shipments of supplies into the affected area. DoD utilizes IRRIS to track movement of military units supporting the incident and can assist FEMA with tracking movement of supplies.

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Comment Resolution Matrix						
(See notes at end of document for explanation of the columns)						
Org/Reviewer	Page #	Para, Figure or Table #	Line #	Type of Comment	Comments	A/R/P
				Critical (C)		
				Substantive (S)		
				Administrative (A)		
US NORTHCOM	-	-				
				C	Recommendation: Coordinate this DoD IG report formally with NGB to ensure its accuracy and objectivity.  Rationale: Given the numerous references to the National Guard Bureau, DoD IG should coordinate its findings with NGB to ensure its facts are accurate before publication.	
	ii	2	2	S	Recommendation: Reword sentence to read: "...training, and exercising with DoD Components, to include the National Guard Bureau, and the primary..."  Rationale: Several national lessons learned reports highlight the need to improve NORTHCOM, NGB and NG coordination.	
	ii	4	4	C	Recommendation: Add "NGB" to the list of organizations mentioned and coordinate appropriately.  Rationale: NGB is a statutory Bureau within the DoD and given its significant role in Hurricane Katrina should be included in the review of this document.	

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	3	5	7	A	Recommendation: Following "Combatant Commander, USNORTHCOM" insert "(CDRUSNORTHCOM)..."	
					Rationale: Simplify and standardize references to CDRUSNORTHCOM	
	3	5	8	A	Recommendation: Reword sentence to read, "...North America to support civil authorities..."	
					Rationale: Grammar	
	4	1	10	S	Recommendation: Reword sentence to read, "The DCO is responsible for receiving, validating and forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate..."	
					Rationale: The DCO must validate requests for military assistance before forwarding them on.	
	4	4			Recommendation: Delete "and State National Guard Title 32 authority" in the first and second lines. JTF Katrina did not include National Guard Title 32 forces.	
					In paragraph line 9, move the sentence starting with "More than 50,000 Title 32 National Guard troops ...." to the previous section which discusses the National Guard.	
	4	1	13	A	Recommendation: Insert "(JOA)" following "joint operations area"	
					Rationale: Simplify and standardize references	

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	4	1	13	S	<p>Recommendation: Insert "consisting of the impacted states of AL, MS, LA,..." after JOA.</p> <p>Rationale: Clarify what the JOA is.</p>	
	4	2	1	S	<p>Recommendation: Reword sentence to read, "The National Guard in State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status is the military's first responder to a natural disaster."</p> <p>Rationale: Until DEPSECDEF England signed the memo on 5 Sep authorizing T32 to be retroactive to 27 Aug all National Guard personnel/capability provided by other states to assist were in a SAD status.</p>	
	4	2	4	S	<p>Recommendation: Delete "Title 32" before "State Active Duty"</p> <p>Rationale: Governors may activate their National Guard under State Active Duty (i.e. not federally funded or T32) to perform state missions.</p>	

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	4	3	1	S	<p>Recommendation: Reword sentence to read: "Up until 5 September all National Guard resources deploying under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) were in SAD. EMAC is an agreement between all States, the District of Columbia and US Territories and provides a framework for mutual aid during emergencies."</p> <p>Rationale: While T32 status was made retroactive for NG responding to Katrina on 5 Sep, the entire response under EMAC initially was in SAD. Moreover, even with T32 authority some states elected to keep their NG in a SAD status.</p>	
	4	4	1	S	<p>Recommendation: Delete sentence or reword.</p> <p>Rationale: State NG in T32 status is considered a state resource versus a DoD resource (i.e. they are not under the C2 of federal authority).</p>	
	4	4	6	S	<p>Recommendation: Insert "mitigate property damage" after human suffering</p> <p>Rationale: Consistency and accuracy</p>	
	4	4	8	S	<p>Recommendation: Replace "had" after JTF-Katrina with "exercised"</p> <p>Rationale: Terminology</p>	
	4	4	10	S	<p>Recommendation: Insert "SAD," after "50,000"</p> <p>Rationale: The NG response was initially in a SAC status and not all NG elected to accept T32 status once it became available</p>	

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	4	1		S	<p>Recommendation: Remove all references to "mission assignments" from FEMA/DHS to DOD throughout the document.</p> <p>Rationale: Correctness. FEMA/DHS does not assign missions to DOD. They submit requests for assistance (RFAs) that only become mission assignment to DOD upon approval of SECDEF.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	4	1		S	<p>Recommendation: Rewrite sentence stating that the DCO forwards MAs "to appropriate military organizations through NORTHCOM."</p> <p>Rationale: Correctness and accuracy. DCOs validate RFAs then forward them to JDOMs through NORTHCOM. Sentence as is gives the impression that the DCO has the option of various organizations.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	4	2		S	<p>Recommendation: Rewrite first sentence to include state active duty (SAD).</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. National Guard first responders can be in either SAD or Title 32.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	

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	6	1	9	S	<p>Recommendation: Insert ", to include the National Guard Bureau, " after "DoD Components"</p> <p>Rationale: NGB is not considered a "component" of DoD and all national level after action/lesson learned reports (i.e. White House, House, Senate) highlight the importance of improving NORTHCOM coordination/collaboration with NGB.</p>	
	7	4	5	S	<p>Recommendation: Reword line "leaving FEMA in control of ongoing DoD recovery efforts."</p> <p>Rationale: The sentence implies that the DCO and subsequently FEMA are in control of <u>all</u> recovery efforts.</p>	
	7	5	1	S	<p>Recommendation: Reword to read: "Despite the National Guard responding initially in SAD status, the decision to authorize Title 32 authority provided vital federal resourcing needed to sustain the critical role the National Guard in providing relief and recovery efforts."</p>	

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	7	5	5	S	<p>Recommendation: Replace paragraph to read: the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the National Guard provided an historic and overwhelming response in the relief and recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina. This accomplishment was achieved, in part, though the EMAC framework. As one of many resources provided and authorized by supporting governors, the state Army and Air National Guard units provided many capabilities essential to saving lives, minimizing human suffering and mitigating property damage.</p> <p>Rationale: * NGB is not a T32 organization * NG units responded in SAD status initially * NG units do not and cannot unilaterally respond to EMAC requests.</p>	
	7	last		S	<p>Recommendation: Remove reference to NGB "assets".</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy and correctness. The NGB is an advisory body only. It has no "assets" nor does it have any force provider or command and control function.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	8	1	3	S	<p>Recommendation: Delete sentence, "From August 30..." or reword.</p> <p>Rationale: NG units deployed in SAD status initially. Despite T32 authority being retroactive the sentence is misleading.</p>	
	8	1	6	A	<p>Recommendation: Delete "also" after Guardsman</p> <p>Rationale: Grammar</p>	
	8	1	11	S	<p>Recommendation: Ensure that Appendix J reflects the T32 numbers only vs. SAD and T32. Otherwise, update sentence to</p>	

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					reflect.	
					Rationale: Consistency and accuracy	
	8	2	1.8	S	Recommendation: Include Coast Guard and Civil Air Patrol in paragraph.	
					Rationale: The USCG and CAP are considered other DOD support. This raises the question of why the National Guard is not entirely addressed in this category?	
	8	3			Recommendation: Delete "and Title 32" in the third line. Title 32 forces do not provide support to FEMA and the Federal agencies through the Mission Assignment process. Title 32 forces work directly for the State.	
	8	4	5	S	Recommendation Insert ", to include the National Guard Bureau, " after "DoD Components"	
					Rationale: NGB is not considered a "component" of DoD and all national level after action/lesson learned reports (i.e. White House, House, Senate) highlight the importance of improving NORTHCOM coordination/collaboration with NGB.	
	9	3			Recommendation:	
					The lessons learned states "NORTHCOM did not coordinate with FEMA on using military assets according to their capabilities; coordinate the deployment and integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces capabilities...". As commented earlier, USNORTHCOM did not have control or visibility of Title 32 forces and, while greater coordination is needed, the report should be careful not to imply that USNORTHCOM has control over deployment and integration of Title 32 forces.	
	9	4	20	S	Recommendation: Add ", the National Guard, " after "National Guard Bureau"	

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					Rationale: Planning and coordination with the "National Guard" in addition to MGB is essential.	
	9	4			Recommendation: This paragraph discusses the JRSOI of both Title 10 and Title 32 forces. These forces were activated and deployed through separate Federal and State mechanisms (Mission Assignment process and EMAC) and operated under separate Federal and State control. The leading and independent role of the State(s) and the resulting impact to unity of effort and the ability to plan and coordinate in advance needs to be considered in this report. This is an issue that cannot be easily overcome by the report's recommendation of "Planning and coordination among USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and primary Federal agencies..."	
	9	5	4	A	Recommendation: Replace "demolished" with "degraded or destroyed"  Rationale: Accuracy	
	10	1	1	A	Recommendation: Replace "delayed" with "complicated:  Rationale: Accuracy	
	10	1	4	S	Recommendation: Reword sentence: "DoD Title 10 forces supported Federal and State communication problems."  Rationale: Federal and State communications required support period...whether it came from DoD or Bell South is not relevant.	
	10	1	7	S	Recommendation: Delete "with USNORTHCOM" and "all" after "for"  Rationale: Lessons learned identified that communications interoperability is larger than NORTHCOM.	
	10	3			Recommendation: The report identifies "a need for USNORTHCOM to plan training and exercises with FEMA and primary Federal agencies on integrating military forces during a domestic natural disaster." As commented earlier, USNORTHCOM	

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					already conducts extensive training and exercises with interagency partners, and is working with DHS to develop a National Level Exercise program.	
	11	3			Recommendation: The report concludes "NORTHCOM should improve its military support to civil authorities. DoD needs to improve its planning and coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security and its subordinate agencies." It should be recognized that there are three DoD entities that have leading roles in planning and coordinating with civil authorities: OSD, Joint Staff and USNORTHCOM.	
	11	3	12	S	Recommendations: Replace sentence with: "Hurricane Katrina also highlighted areas for improvement with respect to integrating Title 10 Federal military with Title 32 and SAD National Guard forces during disaster relief operations. As the DoD, supported combatant command, USNORTHCOM should improve its military support to civil authorities and relationship with the National Guard Bureau. DoD needs to improve its planning, collaboration and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. Improvements in these areas will enable DoD to continue to provide timely assistance to civil authorities if..."  Rationale: Clarification of the core issues that need to be addressed to achieve unity of effort.	
	12	1 & 2			Recommendations: ASD-HD as the Executive Agent for Defense Support of Civil Authorities should be responsible for making the changes to DoD directives. Additionally, U.S. Northern Command is the supported vice supporting command.	
	12	3b	1	S	Recommendation: Replace sentence with: "Collaborate and coordinate with the National Guard Bureau in the development of plans for joint integration of Title 10 Federal military resources and National Guard T32 or SAD forces in support of the National Response Plan."  Rationale: Clarification of the core issues that need to be addressed to achieve unity of effort.	

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	12	3e & f			Recommendations: Both paragraphs refer only to FEMA exercises and should include the DHS exercises and conferences.	
	13	1	1	S	Recommendation: Rewrite and eliminate the "we's"	
					Rationale: "we" is used 10 times.	
	i	4	19-21	U	Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: "The U.S. Northern Command is the supported combatant command for civil support within the United States."	
					Recommendation: Change to read: U.S. Northern Command U.S. Southern Command and US Pacific Command are the supported combatant commands for civil support within their respective Areas of Responsibility.	
					Rationale: Accuracy. USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM are the Supported COCOM for Civil Support in accordance with the DSCA Standing EXORD DTG 281832Z APR 06.	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	i	foot note	36	U	Substantive: The footnote incorrectly alludes that COCOM's are assigned missions in the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. COCOM's are assigned missions in the Unified Command Plan or in EXORDS but not in the JSCP.	
					Recommendation: Change footnote to read: Per DSCA Standing EXORD 281832Z APR 06	
					Rationale: Per DSCA Standing EXORD 281832Z APR 06	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	2	foot note #1	2	U	Substantive: The footnote incorrectly states that the USNORTHCOM AOR includes portions of the Caribbean region.	
					Recommendation: Delete the phrase "and portions of the	

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					Caribbean region."	
					Rationale: Accuracy. This is in accordance with Paragraph 3. Page B-2, and the map at the Tab of the Unified Command Plan, 5 May 06. This recent change placed the Caribbean region in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	4	1	4	U	Substantive: The following sentence inaccurately implies that USNORTHCOM established ARNORTH / Fifth US Army in response to hurricane Katrina. "After the Hurricane Katrina disaster, USNORTHCOM established the 5th U.S. Army/Army North in October 2005, as the Army Service Component Command, providing military support to civil authorities." The decision to establish ARNORTH was made well prior to hurricane Katrina and ARNORTH's Initial Operating Capability was in Sep 05.	
					Recommendation: Change to read: The Army decided to reorganize First and Fifth US Army prior to Hurricane Katrina. The First Army would become the Training and Readiness Command responsible for training Army Reserve Component forces and the Fifth US Army would transform into the Army Service Component supporting USNORTHCOM. The official IOC date had not occurred when hurricane Katrina so the USNORTHCOM leadership decided to use the existing plan where First Army would lead the response task force since the hurricane made landfall in the First Army Area."	
					Rationale: Accuracy. This change more accurately describes what actually happened with respect to the formation of ARNORTH.	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	4		17-18	U	Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: "The Governor can activate a National Guard unit under Title 32 to perform Federal missions or under Title 32 State Active Duty to perform State missions". There are several things wrong with this sentence. The Governor may request to use National Guard forces under Title 32, Chapter 9. This request must be approved	

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					<p>by the SecDef. If approved the National Guard forces will be paid for by the Federal Government but under the Governor's control. The other option is for the Governor to call out his National Guard forces under a State Active Duty status. In this status, forces are still under the control of the Governor and are paid for by the State. National Guard can <u>never</u> be in Title 32 and State Active Duty Status at the same time.</p> <p>Recommendation: Change to read: The National Guard under Title 32 Status is the military's first responder to a natural disaster occurring in their respective State or the United States and its Territories. The Governor can activate a National Guard Unit in a State Active Duty Status or he can request that his National Guard units be activated in a Title 32 status under Chapter 9 Title 32. The Title 32 status decision authority is the SecDef.</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. National Guard forces cannot be in two statuses at once.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	4		30	U	<p>Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: Joint Task Force Katrina. DoD military resources under Title 10 authority and State National Guard Title 32 authority provided critical..." JTF Katrina had no authority over forces in a Title 32 status.</p> <p>Recommendation: Change to read: Joint task Force Katrina. DoD military resources under Title 10 authority and State National Guard Title 32 authority provided critical..."</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. A Title 10 JTF has no authority over Title 32 forces. By discussing Title 32 support under the paragraph entitled "Joint Task Force Katrina", it incorrectly implies that JTF-Katrina had command authority over these forces.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	4		endnote #4	U	<p>Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: "Title 32 includes Title 32 and Title 32 State Active Duty forces."</p>	

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					<p>Recommendation: Delete the sentence</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. NG forces cannot be in two separate statuses at the same time. They are either SAD or Title 32.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	5		2-3	U	<p>Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: "National Guard forces.... were deployed under the command and control of the affected State Governors and Adjutant General to JTF -Katrina joint operations area."</p> <p>Recommendation: Change to read: "National Guard forces.... were deployed under the command and control of the affected State Governors and in their respective State operating areas. Adjutant General to JTF -Katrina joint operations area."</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. State Governors and TAGs determine the operating areas for their State NG forces.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	6		4	U	<p>Substantive: It is incorrect to state that there were more than 70,000 DoD forces... DOD (Title 10) forces numbered approximately 20,000, all other military forces were Title 32 National Guard forces under the command authority of their respective State TAGs and Governors.</p> <p>Recommendation: Change to read: 20,000 DOD forces...</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. Forces in Title 32 Status are not Title 10 DOD forces and are not Federalized. See DoDD 3025.15 para 4.6</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	7		34	U	<p>Substantive: The following sentence is inaccurate: The National Guard Bureau and its National Guard assets, under Title 32 status played a significant role..." The NGB does not own or command</p>	

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					any National Guard assets.	
					Recommendation: Change to read: "The National Guard Bureau and its National Guard assets, under Title 32 status-played a significant role..."	
					Rationale: Accuracy. The NGB does not own or command any National Guard assets.	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	9	2	4	U	Substantive: This incorrectly states that there was no USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment in effect at the time of Hurricane Katrina. The approved USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment was signed on 20 Aug 04 by MG Rowe, the USNORTHCOM J3. This was approved a year prior to Hurricane Katrina. This document is under the review process and there is an updated Draft. However, the 20 Aug 04 approved version is still in effect.	
					Recommendation: Delete the sentence, "Additionally, the USNORTHCOM 'Civil Support Concept of Employment,' dated May 13, 2005, was still in draft at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall." Replace with, "Additionally, the USNORTHCOM 'Civil Support Concept of Employment,' dated 20 Aug 04, was in effect at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall."	
					Rationale: Accuracy. This is in accordance with the USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment, dated 20 Aug 04.	
					Sponsor Comment:	
	12	1. & 2.	Para 1, Lines 4 & 5. Para 2, Lines 4 & 5.	U	Substantive: The term "defense support <u>to</u> civil authorities" is incorrect. The correct term is "defense support <u>of</u> civil authorities."	
					Recommendation: Replace "defense support <u>to</u> civil authorities" with "defense support <u>of</u> civil authorities."	

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					<p>Rationale: Accuracy. This is in accordance with the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, Page 5.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	16	3	9	U	<p>Substantive: The phrase: "Title 32 or Title 32 State active duty status" is inaccurate. There is no such thing as a "Title 32 State active duty status."</p> <p>Recommendation: Reword "Title 32 or Title 32 State active duty status" to "Title 32 or Title 32 State Active Duty status"</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy. In accordance with US Code, Title 32.</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	19			S	<p>Recommendation: Replace Table Title with: "Title 10, Title 32 and SAD Relationships" Delete "Title 32" in the top right block</p> <p>Rationale: State Active Duty has nothing to do with T32.</p>	
	19			U	<p>Substantive: The term, "State Active Duty Title 32" in the title of the fourth column is inaccurate. Also, a governor does not have the authority to order to duty National Guard forces into a Title 32 status. A governor does have the authority to order to duty National Guard forces into a State Active Duty status and to request to the Secretary of Defense that they be placed into a Title 32, Federally funded status.</p> <p>Recommendation: Correct the chart as follows:</p> <p>Third column, first row: National Guard Title 32; Authority to order to duty – delete existing wording and replace with "Secretary of Defense".</p> <p>Title, fourth column: State Active Duty Title 32 - change the title to only "State Active Duty" and delete "Title 32" (NG forces cannot be in both status at once)</p>	

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					<p>Rationale: In accordance with US Code, Title 32, Chapter 9, Sec 902, "The Secretary of Defense may provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be necessary and appropriate for participation by the National Guard units or members, as the case may be."</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	23			U	<p>Substantive: The term, "Title 32 State Active Duty Force" in the title of the fifth column is inaccurate.</p> <p>Recommendation: Correct the chart as follows: Reword the title of the fifth column from "Total Title 32 State Active Duty Force" to "Total Title 32 Force".</p> <p>Rationale: In accordance with US Code, Title 32</p> <p>Sponsor Comment:</p>	
	25			S	<p>Recommendation: Under "Department of the Army" delete "Chief, National Guard Bureau" and replace with Director, Army National Guard</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy</p>	
	25			S	<p>Recommendation: Under "Department of the Air Force" add "Director, Air National Guard"</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy</p>	
	25			S	<p>Recommendation: Under "Other Defense Organization" add "Chief, National Guard Bureau"</p> <p>Rationale: Accuracy</p>	

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UNCLASSIFIED

## U.S. Air Force Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

September 11, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING OFFICE OF  
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: HQ USAF/A3/5  
1630 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington DC 20330-1630

SUBJECT: Report on the Use of DoD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster  
(Project No. D2006-D00LA-0009.000)

We concur with the findings and recommendations of the DoDIG Report on the Use of DoD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Project No. D2006-D00LA-0009.000). Since there are no recommendations specific to the Air Force, the Air Force has no management comments.

If you have any questions or concerns with our comments, please contact Lt Col Nancy Klein, A3SHC, (703) 696-4824.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carol H. Chandler".

CARROL H. CHANDLER, Lt Gen, USAF  
DCS, Air, Space & Information  
Operations, Plans & Requirements

# U.S. Transportation Command Comments

Final Report  
Reference



## UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DRIVE  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

08 Sep 06

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
ATTENTION: MR. KEITH OWENS

FROM: TCJ8

SUBJECT: DODIG Report No. D2006-D000LA-0009.000, Resources Supporting the  
Hurricane Katrina Disaster (FOUO)

1. USTRANSCOM concurs with the draft report as written.
2. The USTRANSCOM POC is Ms Rose Wesolowski, TCJ8-A, DSN 779-2447,  
Commercial 618-229-2447, or email [rose.wesolowski@ustranscom.mil](mailto:rose.wesolowski@ustranscom.mil).

ALAN K. BENTLEY  
Director, Program Analysis  
and Financial Management

cc:  
TCCS  
TCJ3  
TCJ5  
TCJ6  
TCSG  
TCCS-JIACG  
AMC/FMFF  
SDDC  
MSC

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## National Guard Bureau Comments



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE  
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU  
1411 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY  
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-3231

NGB-ZC-IR

6 September 2006


For Office of the Inspector General Department of Defense, ATTN: Mr. Donald A. Bloomer, Readiness and Logistical Support, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4700

Thru MAJ Timothy Loudermilk, DAMO-OD, Pentagon

SUBJECT: National Guard Bureau Command Response on "Use of DOD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster", Project No. D2006-D000LA-0009.000 August 7, 2006 DRAFT REPORT

1. The National Guard Bureau is responding to and forwarding its Command Response to the DODIG, Draft Report recommendations, for Audit Project D2006-D000LA-0009, "Use of DOD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster".
2. The point of contact for this information is Mrs. Patricia Gallop, 703-607-0180.

Encl  
as

*For*   
DERRICK E. MILLER  
Chief, Internal Review  
National Guard Bureau



**Chief National Guard Bureau  
Command Response to DODIG Draft Audit Report D2006-D000LA-0009  
Use of DOD Resources Supporting the Hurricane Katrina Disaster**

**1. Recommendation:** We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy update DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" to identify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the executive agent for defense support to civil authorities and the U.S. Northern Command as the supporting combatant command for defense support to civil authorities.

**Command Response:** Not applicable.

**2. Recommendation:** We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict update DoD Directive 3020.15, "Military Support to Civil Authorities" to identify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the executive agent for defense support to civil authorities and the U.S. Northern Command as the supporting combatant command for defense support to civil authorities.

**Command Response:** Not applicable.

**3. Recommendation:** We recommend that the Combatant Commander, U.S. Northern Command:

**Command Response:**

a. Complete and implement plans on military support to civil authorities for all DoD Components and agencies supporting the National Response Plan.

Concur without comment.

b. Coordinate with the National Guard Bureau for developing a plan for joint integration of DoD military resources responding to and supporting the National Response Plan.

Concur without comment.

c. Coordinate military communication capabilities with primary Federal agencies and State and local authorities to improve standardization and interoperability of communications.

Concur without comment.

d. Coordinate and support improving the Federal Emergency Management Agency's logistical management process and in-transit visibility for requested equipment and supplies during a domestic crisis.

Concur without comment.

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e. Plan and coordinate DoD participation in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's domestic crisis exercise and conferences.

Concur without comment.

f. Develop, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, training and exercise programs that support the National Response Plan.

Concur without comment.

**Other Comments:**

Page 4

Section: "The National Guard"

Paragraph: 1

Sentence 1:

**Currently Reads:** The National Guard under Title 32 status is the military's first responder...

**Should Read:** The National Guard, State Active Duty, is the military's first responder...

**Justification:** Title 32 authorization (a federal status under the control of the governor) is requested by the governor after an emergency has been declared by the President.

Page 4

Section: "The National Guard"

Paragraph: 1

Sentence: 2

**Currently Reads:** The Governor can activate a National Guard unit under Title 32 to perform Federal missions or under Title 32 State Active Duty to perform State missions.

**Should Read:** The Governor can request a National Guard unit under Title 32 to perform Federal or State missions and State Active Duty National Guard units to perform State missions.

**Justification:** Title 32 State Active Duty doesn't exist. Title 32 is a Federal status under the control and authority of the Governor.

Page 4

Section: "The National Guard"

Paragraph: 2

Sentence: 1

**Currently Reads:** Title 32 forces deployed under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact...

**Should Read:** National Guard Forces deployed under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact...

**Justification:** National Guard Forces were in Title 32 and State Active Duty. Some State's kept their National Guard units in State Active Duty.

Page 7

Section: DoD Title 32 Missions and Accomplishments  
Paragraph: 1  
Sentence: 1

**Currently Reads:** The National Guard Bureau and its National Guard assets, under Title 32, played a significant role...  
**Should Read:** The National Guard Bureau and its National Guard assets played a significant role...  
**Justification:** The National Guard deployed in Title 32 and State Active Duty.

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Page 8  
Section: DoD Title 32 Missions and Accomplishments  
Paragraph: 1  
Sentence: 3

**Currently Reads:** During this deployment, National Guardsmen also saved lives, minimized human suffering, and mitigated property damage ...  
**Should Read:** During this deployment, National Guardsmen also saved lives, minimized human suffering, *assisted law enforcement*, and mitigated property damage ...  
**Justification:** Document accuracy

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Page 9  
Section: Interoperable Communication Architecture  
Paragraph: 1  
Sentence: 3

**Currently Reads:** Inadequate communication *delayed* Title 10 and Title 32 forces' relief...  
**Should Read:** Inadequate communication *impacted* Title 10 and Title 32 forces' relief...  
**Justification:** Delayed sends the wrong message. The National Guard was providing relief operations immediately. Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana at 0510 CDT, 29 Aug 2005. The National Guard responded with 7,841 personnel on that same day, in accordance with the National Guard Time Line posted in the "NGB Final Report dated 21 December 2005".

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## **Team Members**

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Readiness and Operations Support prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

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